U.S.S. Allen M. Sumner DD-692
Commander Destroyer Squadron 60 Action Report

OF6-60/A16-3

Commander Destroyer Squadron Sixty,

Serial 013 c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
CONFIDENTIAL 2 February 1945.

From:

Commander Destroyer Squadron SIXTY. (Commander Minesweeping Support Unit (CTU 77.2.9) and Commander Screen, Bombardment and Fire Support Group).
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Task Unit 77.2.1 (ComBatDiv 2).
(2) Commander Task Group 77.2 (ComBatRon 1).
(3) Commander Task Force 78. (Commander 7th Amphib. Force).
(4) Commander Task Force 77. (Commander Luzon Attack Force).
(5) Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
(6) Commander in Chief, U.  S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:

Action Report - Lingayen Gulf, Luzon Landing Operation, 2-18 January 1945.

References:

(a) PacFlt ltr. 1CL-45.
(b) CANF SWPA Operation   Plan No. 17-44.
(c) CTF 78 Operation   Plan No. 103-44
(d) CTG 77.2 Operation   Plan No. 3-44
(e) CTU 77.2.1 Operation   Plan No. 5-44.
(f) ComBatDiv 3 Sortie and rendezvous instructions, Serial 0041 of 31 December 1944. 

Enclosure:

(A) ComDesRon 60 screening instructions - serial 0017 of 31 December 1944.
(B) Action Report of ComDesDiv 120.
(C) Action Report of USS BARTON DD 722.
(D) Action Report of USS WALKE DD723.
(E) Action Report of USS LAFFEY DD 724.
(F) Action Report of USS O'BRIEN (Not available, will be forwarded)
(G) Action Report of USS ALLEN M. SUMNER DD 692.
(H) Action Report of USS MOALE DD 693.
(I) Action Report of USS INGRAHAM DD 694.
(J) Action Report of USS LOWRY DD 770.
(K) Action Report of HMAS ARUNTA (Not available, will be forwarded)
(L) Action Report of HMAS WARRAMUNGA (Not available, will be forwarded)


PART I - SUMMARY


     1.     Ships of Desrons 60 and 56 composed the screen of the Bombardment and Fire Support Group (TG 77.2) and participated in the preliminary bombardment, minesweeping support, underwater demolition teams support, assault landing, fire support, and covering operations of our landing forces in LINGAYEN GULF, LUZON, P. I., between the dates of 2 and 18 January 1945.

     2.     While enroute to and at the objective area prior to S-Day, the Bombardment and Fire Support Group in company with the Escort Carrier Group, or detached task units of the former, were repeatedly attacked by enemy planes, most of them of the suicide variety. Many of our ships were hit by these planes. Enemy bombing attacks by ordinary means were usually ineffective.

     3.    After preliminary bombardment, the landings were effected with little or no opposition. After S plus 1 day, the Bombardment and Fire Support Group operated to the Northwest of LINGAYEN GULF with the Escort Carrier Group to cover the landings against enemy surface attacks.

     4.     The Minesweeping Fire Support Unit (TU 77.2.9), supporting minesweeping operations in the LINGAYEN GULF from S-3 to S-Day were subjected to many suicide attacks because of the isolated stations of the ships. On S-3, The WALKE was attacked by four suicide planes, the ALLEN M. SUMNER and BARTON each by two, the O'BRIEN one, and the WARRAMUNGA by one which diverted its attack to an APD, the BROOKS.


PART II


     1.     The following is a recapitulation of the units operating under the tactical command of Commander Destroyer Squadron SIXTY during period covered by this report:

            (a) Screen Commander for Task Group 77.2 during periods of:

                 0900, 10 January to 0735, 11 January
                 1940, 12 January to 0700, 15 January
                 1700, 15 January to 0700, 16 January
                 1700, 16 January to           18 January

                 Desron 60: BARTON (F), WALKE, LAFFEY, O'BRIEN, ALLEN M. SUMNER (CDD 120), MOALE, INGRAHAM, LOWRY.
                                   (WALKE, O'BRIEN and ALLEN M. SUMNER were detached from TG 77.2 at 1700, 9 January).

                 ARUNTA (detached 9 January), WARRAMUNGA.

                 Desron 56: NEWCOMB (F), BENNION, H. L. EDWARDS, R. P. LEARY, LEUTZE, IZARD (CDD 112), KIMBERLY assigned to Desron 60 on 10 Jan.), BRYANT, W. D. PORTER

                  Transdiv 101: 2100, 5 January to 1300, 6 January.

                  Transdiv 102: 2 January to 1930, 5 January.

            (b) Screen Commander for combined units of Task Groups 77.2 and 77.4 (TU 77.2.1 and TU 77.4.2) when operating in disposition 4R0 during periods:

                   2 January to 0400, 6 January
                   0900, 11 January to 1715, 12 January.
                   0700-1700 on both 15 and 16 January.

                   Desron 60 (as above)
                   ARUNTA, WARRAMUNGA
                   Desron 56 (2 Jan. to 1800, 5 Jan.)
                   Desron 51 (HALL (F), PAUL HAMILTON, ABBOT, BURNS, BELL, TWIGGS)
                   EDMUNDS, H. F. CLARK
                   O'FLAHERTY, J. C. BUTLER (reported 1000, 11 Jan.).

            (c) Commander Minesweeping Support Unit (CTU 77.2.9) 1300, 6 January to 1700, 8 January.

                    BARTON
                    O'BRIEN (returned to TU 77.2.1 at 1500, 6 January)
                    ARUNTA (returned to TG 77.2 at 2100, 6 January)
                    WARRAMUNGA
                    LEUTZE, BRYANT (reported 1800, 6 January).

            (d) SAN FABIAN Fire Support Unit 0600 to 1300, 6 January; 1745, 8 January to 1930, 9 January.

                    Desron 60.

     3.     TG 77.2's objectives were to destroy enemy personnel, installations and facilities bordering LINGAYEN GULF; to support minesweeping and underwater demolition groups engaged in clearing the gulf, to furnish pre-landing bombardment on the beaches; and to provide call fire support when required by the troops ashore. The destroyer units operating under Comdesron 60 were engaged in all of the above assignments as well as providing A/S and AA support for the cruisers and battleships.

     4.     Task Groups 77.2 and 77.4 were formed in disposition 4R0, consisting of units from both groups in two circular dispositions. Comdesron 60 in BARTON was Screen Commander of the van group, which included the following units: MAKIN ISLAND at fleet center with five other CVE's (LUNGA POINT, BISMARCK SEA, HOGGATT BAY, TULAGI, SALAMAUA) equally spaced on circle 2; CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA, COLORADO, PORTLAND, LOUISVILLE, and SHROPSHIRE equally spaced on circle 3.5; KIMBERLY, W. D. PORTER, R. P. LEARY, LEUTZE, MOALE, and WALKE stationed on a chord between each pair of heavy ships; outer screen on circle 7 composed of 17 ships with BARTON on axis and order clockwise: BARTON. IZARD, BRYANT, H. L. EDWARDS, NEWCOMB, SANDS, BELKNAP, WARRAMUNGA, OVERTON, INGRAHAM, HUMPHRIES, BLESSMAN, ALLEN M. SUMNER, LOWRY, ARUNTA, O'BRIEN, LAFFEY.

     5.     Enemy forces encountered consisted of: one coastal patrol vessel detected proceeding northward along the LUZON coast between SANTA CRUZ and  TAGUDIN; planes of all types probably totaling about 150 in number.


PART III


2 January 1945.

     As part of TG 77.2 was based at LEYTE at the start of the operation, while the remaining units were escorting TG 77.4 from KOSSOL ROADS, the sortie from SAN PEDRO BAY and rendezvous in lower LEYTE GULF were executed under the command of CTU 77.2.1 (Rear Adm. WEYLER, ComBatDiv 3 in NEW MEXICO). Heavy units in this group included the NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI, AUSTRALIA, SHROPSHIRE, LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, and three AO's -- WINOOSKI, SUAMICO, and SALAMONIE. Comdesron 60 was Screen Commander with the following units: Desron 60, NEWCOMB, KIMBERLY, BRYANT, W. D. PORTER, PAUL HAMILTON, ARUNTA, WARRAMUNGA (16 DD's): EICHENBERGER and J. E. CRAIG (2 DE); and DICKERSON, SANDS, CLEMSON ( 3 APD).

2200 - All ships under tactical command of Comdesron 60 in forward semi-circle (See Enclosure  A), of screen got underway from SAN PEDRO BAY in accordance with Comdesron 60 020510 dispatch, while ships in rear semi-circle followed 30 minutes later after the heavy ships had sortied. Forward semi-circle ships proceeded to point "X" where two screening lines 4000 yards apart and parallel to "Xray-Oboe" line were established.

3 January 1945.

     Ships of forward semi-circle patrolled screening lane until 0135 when NEW MEXICO passed point "O". At this time a circular screen was formed around heavy ships.

0248 - Formed disposition 4RW in accordance with reference (e), on SUAMICO guide, course and axis 130訊, speed 7 knots.

0317 - Air alert, but no enemy planes closed the disposition.

0352 - c/c 180訊.

0445 - Made radar contact with CTG 77.2 and TG 77.4 approaching on bearing 120訊.

0450 - Reoriented screen to axis 180訊.

0500-0700 - Steamed on various courses awaiting arrival of other units of TG 77.4 and TG 77.2.

0730 - Commenced forming disposition 4RO in accordance with reference (d), with units of both TG 77.2 and TG 77.4 divided into van and rear groups. Comdesron 60 Screen Commander of van group consisting of following units: KIMBERLY, W. D. PORTER, R. P. LEARY, LEUTZE, MOALE and WALKE stationed on chords between heavy ships on circle 3.5; outer screen on circle 7 with BARTON on axis and clockwise order of BARTON, IZARD, BRYANT, EDWARDS, NEWCOMB, SANDS, BELKNAP, WARRAMUNGA, OVERTON, INGRAHAM, HUMPHRIES, BLESSMAN, ALLEN M. SUMNER, LOWRY, ARUNTA, O'BRIEN and LAFFEY.

0840 - MAKIN ISLAND designated fleet guide and CTG 77.4 as OTC.

1025 - c/c 217訊.

1045 - c/c 241訊, rounding BINIT POINT.

1102 - Rotated fleet axis to 241訊. Up to this time transfers of various units had been ordered to effect above disposition. In addition the passing of mail and transfer of passengers was carried out by various destroyers in both the van and rear groups.

1141 - BARTON reported a possible sound contact and OTC ordered "emergency turn 9". Contact was investigated and found to be false.

1341 - A small schooner was observed approaching disposition on the port bow and upon orders from the OTC, the O'BRIEN was designated by Comdesron 60 to investigate. After a thorough search, the O'BRIEN reported that the vessel contained five Filipinos traveling under a U. S. Army pass.

1445 - All mail deliveries were completed and ships of screen assumed normal assigned stations.

1854 - CTG 77.2 reassumed command of van group.

1900 - Formed disposition 4RN in accordance with reference (d), with screens remaining the same.

1905 - AA fire observed in rear group and SHROPSHIRE reported that an enemy plane had crashed 100 yards on her beam.

2112 - CTG 77.2 ordered Comdesron 60 to designate one DD to investigate a surface contact. IZARD was designated, but contact proved to be false and IZARD returned to station at 2125.

2122 - c/c 257訊, passing SIQUIJOR ISLAND.

2312 - Commenced zigzagging according to plan 23.

     CVE's conducted ASP operations during the day, as well as supplying CAP. No bogies were reported.

4 January 1945.

0045 - Several bogies were reported in area, but no attacks were made.

0052 - MAKIN ISLAND reported a man overboard and requested DD's astern to keep a sharp lookout for him.

0109 - LEUTZE reported MAKIN ISLAND man had been recovered.

0207 - Ceased zigzagging.

0215 - Commenced zigzagging according to plan 23.

0335 - More bogies were reported, but none closed within 10 miles.

0547 - MAKIN ISLAND directed to take station at fleet center.

0611 - Ceased zigzagging.

0615 - MAKIN ISLAND designated as guide.

0622 - Changed fleet axis to 330訊, passed SIATIN POINT.

0626 - Formed disposition 4RO.

0630 - Commenced fueling ships of screen from tankers in rear group.

0718 - With the absence of several units fueling, Comdesron 60 ordered outer screen to form a 15 station screen.

1123 - Enemy planes were reported in the area. OTC ordered fueling operations to cease until the area was clear. Rear group reported sighting one "Nick" and CAP reported an unsuccessful interception, but no attacks were made on either group.

1202 - Resumed fueling operations.

1437 - Plane attempting to land on HOGGATT BAY crashed into the water and the WALKE picked up the pilot.

1440 - c/c 000訊. Commenced transit of CUYO EAST PASS.

     During the early afternoon numerous bogies were reported by several ships on various bearings, but no attacks developed until 1600.

     Other alarms were caused by reported periscopes and mines. Upon investigation, the periscopes proved to be the same type of fishing stakes which had been observed during the MINDORO Operation. The mines turned out to be either belly tanks or coconuts, although one was the buoy, "Alice Faye", which had been placed in swept channel for MINDORO Operation.

1605 - Comdesron 60 ordered BRYANT to pick up radar equipment from COLORADO and to exchange stations with KIMBERLY.

1625 - Ceased zigzagging. c/s 12 knots.

1712 - Enemy planes were reported to be in area, and all ships were alerted. At 1715 a "Hamp" was observed approaching disposition on a bearing of 030 at medium speed and about 3500 feet altitude. The plane was not observed until almost directly above BARTON, and proceeded toward the center of disposition. No screening ships opened fire until the plane was almost over the center of the disposition. CALIFORNIA opened up with all AA batteries but no apparent results were observed. Plane went into a suicide dive with the LUNGA POINT as its target, and crashed into the sea, missing the CVE by a very narrow margin. No casualties or damage were suffered by the LUNGA POINT.

     At approximately the same time a large column of heavy black smoke was observed in rear group, and it was learned that the OMMANEY BAY had been crashed by a suicide plane in the bridge structure, starting several fires

     During this period the disposition was maneuvering on various courses at various speeds. Two more enemy planes were observed to the northward of disposition at 1732 being attacked by CAP and bombs were dropped in the water about 5 miles ahead of the task group. Other enemy planes were reported in the area hiding behind numerous cloud formations, but no further attacks were made.

1830 - A large explosion was observed in the OMMANEY BAY. Shortly afterwards the TWIGGS reported that most of the survivors had been picked up and recommended that the CVE be torpedoed.

1905 - Disposition 4RN was formed with the CALIFORNIA becoming the guide and the MAKIN ISLAND taking station on circle 1.5 with the other carriers. The axis changed to 330訊.

1910 - Ordered screen to form 17 ship screen and to rotate to conform to new axis.

1930 - c/c 310訊, c/s 12 knots.

2215 - OTC of rear group requested that speed be reduced to effect transfer of serious casualties to large ships, and the speed was changed to 10 knots.

2342 - A surface contact to the northeast of disposition was identified by the H. L. EDWARDS visually as two friendly PT boats based at MINDORO.

2349 - c/c 333.

5  January 1945.

0001 - Radar contacts indicated several ships lying close in to the MINDORO coast, and CTG 77.2 ordered the H. L. EDWARDS to investigate.

0015 - As ships in question were very close to our beachhead on MINDORO, Comdesron 60 recommended to CTG 77.2 that H. L. EDWARDS be withdrawn to avoid any possible mistaken identities.

0017 - The H. L. EDWARDS was ordered to resume station.

0055 - A radar contact with a group of ships 15 miles to the westward was identified as CortDiv 37 with 3 tankers.

0255 - AA fire was observed in vicinity of rear group.

0307 - An unidentified surface craft 10 miles to the northeast was investigated by the H. L. EDWARDS, and found to be more PT boats.

0500 - Numerous surface targets reported by various ships of the disposition at ranges of from 8 to 12 miles and on various courses. None were investigated or identified, but none closed the disposition further.

0625 - Formed disposition 4RO, with MAKIN ISLAND resuming station at fleet center.

0658 - Axis changed to 000訊 and course to 300訊.

0756 - Several large raids of planes were reported to be approaching from 30 to 60 miles to the north.

0800 -CTG 77.2 requested one destroyer be designated to make mail deliveries, but at 0824 many bogies were again reported and all deliveries were postponed. No raids closed the disposition at this time, but the CAP reported a number of interceptions and enemy planes splashed.

1442 - Upon receipt of report from CTG 77.6 that two enemy DD's were approaching minesweepers at high speed, CTG 77.2 ordered CTG 77.4 to launch a bombing and torpedo strike against enemy units involved. The enemy DD's were about 35 miles NE of TG 77.2 and about 20 miles southeast of the minesweepers. It is possible that they sortied from SUBIC BAY.

1645 - CTG 77.2 ordered SHROPSHIRE to exchange stations with COLUMBIA then stationed in rear group. It was also planned to exchange half the destroyers in the two screens in groups of three in order to place all units of TU 77.2.1 in rear group and of TU 77.2.2 in van group.

1646 - Comdesron 60 ordered WALKE and MOALE to join BARTON as screen for SHROPSHIRE during transfer, and ordered Comdesron 56 to assume command of screen.

1650 - Enemy planes were reported to be in the area and proposed transfers were cancelled until situation cleared. The BARTON, MOALE, and WALKE took stations in rear semi-circle of van group screen.

1714 - LOUISVILLE hit on bridge structure by suicide plane.

1730 - ARUNTA was hit by plane and reported she would be unable to make any headway for half an hour. The INGRAHAM was ordered to stand by until emergency repairs could be affected.

1746 - About 4 or 5 enemy aircraft were observed approaching rear group from the west, flying very low on the water. One plane dropped a bomb on the AUSTRALIA, and although caught in an extremely heavy AA barrage, continued on to crash the flight deck of the MANILA BAY. A second plane following close behind the first crashed on the DE STAFFORD.

     Because of the distance and the fact that the sky was obscured by AA bursts and smoke from the MANILA BAY and STAFFORD, it was impossible to follow the maneuvers of the remaining enemy planes in the attacking group. Two were observed splashed by wildcats, and it is believed that all were accounted for.

1837 - CTG 77.2 ordered Comdesron 60 and SHROPSHIRE to make scheduled exchange. Comdesron 60 ordered BARTON, WALKE, and MOALE to form screen 53 on SHROPSHIRE, and proceeded toward rear group.

     Units of Desron 51, Desron 60, and CortDiv 70 were exchanged in groups of three. Completed transfers at 2100.

2100 - Screening ships of TU 77.2.1 and TU 77.4.2 combined. Stationed PAUL HAMILTON, HALL, ABBOT, BURNS, and BELL between heavy ships on inner circle. The outer screen on circle 7 consisted of following ships in clockwise order: BARTON, LAFFEY, O'BRIEN, WALKE, CLEMSON, BADGER, RATHBURNE, DICKERSON, BULL, LOWRY, MOALE, TWIGGS, and ALLEN M. SUMNER.

6 January 1945.

0330 - TG 77.4 commenced to form in two units preparatory to proceeding to assigned operating areas.

0617 - CTG 77.2 ordered CTU 77.2.1 to proceed to carry out schedule. TU 77.2.1 changed course to 090訊, and proceeded toward bombardment area off SAN FERNANDO-PORO POINT.

0837 - Comdesron 60 recommended that screen be moved in 2000 yards and with CTU 77.2.1's approval, destroyers and APD's were ordered to take station on circle 5.

0914 - CTU 77.2.1 ordered ALLEN M. SUMNER to replace BARTON as supporting ship for minesweepers, and Comdesdiv 120 replaced Comdesron 60 as CTU 77.2.9. This change was caused by the fact that the automatic train on BARTON's main battery director was inoperative.

1005 - Battleships and cruisers launched aircraft for bombardment spotting.

1020 - TU 77.2.1 formed disposition 2CW in accordance with reference (e), which placed heavy ships in column for bombardment in the following order: AUSTRALIA, SHROPSHIRE, NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI, WEST VIRGINIA, MINNEAPOLIS. BARTON, LAFFEY, and O'BRIEN formed screen 53 to the northwest, while the MOALE, INGRAHAM and LOWRY formed the same screen south of the heavy ships. The 5 APD's carrying the Underwater Demolition Teams and a highly explosive cargo were stationed as additional screening vessels 3000 yards to seaward of heavy ships.

1022 - Comdesdiv 120 with ALLEN M. SUMNER, WALKE, ARUNTA, and WARRAMUNGA were released as TU 77.2.9 to proceed to the support of minesweepers then engaged in operations at the mouth of LINGAYEN GULF.

     Just after WARRAMUNGA cleared TU 77.2.2, she was attacked by 3 Vals which she succeeded in repelling. She was then recalled to TU 72.2.2 in view of the air situation, but was finally released to TU 77.2.9 about 1115.

1026 - A spotting plane reported one large tanker and a number of small craft in SAN FERNANDO harbor. Enemy AA batteries located near PORO POINT opened fire on spotting planes, but firing was meager and inaccurate.

1041 - Heavy ships opened fire on SAN FERNANDO-PORO POINT installations and shipping in SAN FERNANDO HARBOR. Range was about 16,000 yards.

1054 - Comdesron 60 informed CTU 77.2.1 that enemy shipping was within range of destroyers. Permission was given to take these targets under fire and the BARTON and O'BRIEN were ordered to open fire. Several hits were observed bit it was not possible to estimate damage inflicted.

1100 - The minesweepers reported that shore batteries had opened fire on them.

1120 - The first visual sighting of enemy aircraft occurred at this time when the MOALE reported one plane flying along the beach low on the water. It passed down the port side of the column and was taken under fire by all ships, but escaped over the mountains to the eastward apparently undamaged.

1122 - The WALKE reported enemy planes in sight over the ALLEN M. SUMNER's group. Gun flashes were observed from PORO POINT batteries firing on the heavy ships. Firing appeared to be quite inaccurate, particularly in range and no splashes were seen with 400 yards. The shells fell near the MOALE and MINNEAPOLIS.

1135 - Another plane was sighted to the north of the disposition, circling the group beyond gun range. This plane completed about 180 arc before disappearing to the northwest.

1141 - The disposition reversed course to 330訊.

1153 - Observed Wildcats splash one "Val".

1200 - Enemy suicide planes made a sudden attack on both the minesweeping and bombardment groups. The NEW MEXICO was hit in the bridge structure with the plane exploding as it crashed. The WEST VIRGINIA had a near miss from a bomb.

     The attacking planes used the close proximity of land to the utmost advantage and in some cases dove out of the sun. About 5 were shot down, several missing other units by a very small margin.

     In the minesweeping group the WALKE was attacked by four planes which approached simultaneously on the starboard side. Two were shot down, one crashing within 50 feet of the fantail, the third swung around to the port side and crashed the bridge structure in the vicinity of the sea cabin. The bomb passed through CIC, but did not explode. The bridge was enveloped in a gasoline fire and many casualties resulted. The fourth plane was also shot down.

     At the same time the ALLEN M. SUMNER was attacked by 3 planes in rapid succession. The first two were driven off by SUMNER's AA fire, but the third approaching from the port bow, dove through rigging, hit the No. 2 stack, and crashed on the after torpedo mount. The bomb carried by the plane exploded as the plane crashed.

     The NEW MEXICO's communications were temporarily disrupted and Combatdiv 4 in the WEST VIRGINIA assumed command while the NEW MEXICO pulled out of the battle line, screened by the LAFFEY.

     During the melee, one of the MINNEAPOLIS' SOC's was fired on by one of our own CAP or a ship, and had to make a forced landing.

1219 - Comdesron 60 ordered the INGRAHAM to replace ALLEN M. SUMNER in support of the minesweepers, and the ALLEN M. SUMNER to rejoin the screen.

1237 - The LOWRY reported one man killed and minor fragment holes as a result of friendly fire during 1200 attack.

1240 - WALKE reported that all fires were under control. No damage had been done to engine spaces, but CIC and the main director were both knocked out.

1241 - MOALE reported she was picking up pilot from spotting plane, but discovered plane overturned and pilot dead. Destroyed the plane with gunfire.

1245 - Ordered O'BRIEN to relieve WALKE and to take charge of the minesweeping fire support group.

1250 - The battleships and cruisers commenced recovery of aircraft.

1255 - The INGRAHAM picked up MINNEAPOLIS pilot.

1306 - Sine the BARTON's main battery director had now been temporarily repaired, Comdesron 60 requested permission to replace the INGRAHAM with the BARTON and to assume charge of minesweeping support unit, as had been originally planned.

1350 - While enroute to the minesweeping group, the BARTON picked out of the water a torpedoman from the ALLEN M. SUMNER. The man was alive, but unconscious and very badly burned and injured, and died at 2300.

1410 - Comdesron 60 ordered the O'BRIEN to proceed to group formerly supported by the WALKE.

1432 - The O'BRIEN, moving northwest along swept channel, was passing the BARTON on reverse course about 500 yards on the BARTON's starboard beam when both ships were suddenly attacked by suicide planes. These planes used cloud cover and smoke from burning shore installations very cleverly during their approach. One of BARTON's 20 mm. opened up on the plane diving on the O'BRIEN. The plane struck the propeller guard on the port quarter, starting a fire in the adjacent compartment and knocking a large hole in the side, which caused considerable flooding.

     A few minutes later the second plane, a "Zeke", attacked the BARTON, coming in from the quarter in a steep dive. Although taken under fire by all guns that could bear, and hit repeatedly, it seemed to be impossible to deflect the plane's course. It passed very close to the radar antenna and struck the port anchor a glancing blow as it crashed into the water. The plane came so close that the bridge, pilot house, and even the director were covered with water, gasoline and debris from the plane.

     As the destroyers supporting the minesweepers seemed to have been established as a primary target by the enemy, CTG 77.2 was advised of the urgent need for air cover in that area.

1504 - Before the CAP arrived, the BARTON was again attacked, this time by a twin-engined plane, probably a Frances. The plane approached from the starboard quarter, was spotted visually at a range of 4000 yards, and immediately taken under fire by all batteries. A section of the port wing was shot away, and the port engine was afire. The plane was unable to turn into the ship because of loss of control, passed 30 feet over the fantail, and crashed in flames about 50 yards off the port bow. The BARTON was maneuvering radically at flank speed during this attack.

     Soon after this attack, a CAP consisting of 2 divisions of fighters with two more patrolling about 4 miles inland, arrived and no further attacks were made on the minesweeping groups during the remainder of the day. The CAP tallyhoed 2 enemy planes near the beach almost immediately. Mine Squadron 10, consisting of 5 YMS, was supported by the BARTON, which patrolled station about 2000 yards astern at 15 knots. During the afternoon, dive combing attacks by carrier planes were observed on objectives along the west coast of LINGAYEN GULF.

1730 - Low flying enemy planes were observed approaching the gulf from the north, range about 20,000 yards, apparently headed for TG 77.2 which was then about 8 miles southwest of the BARTON. CTG 77.2 was notified by Comdesron 60 of enemy planes in the area and again at 1758 when a second group was observed making a low level approach.

1807 - However, at least two ships of the group were hit, and columns of black smoke were observed.

1825 - Comdesron 60 recommended to CTG 77.6 that various sweeping units be brought together to enable destroyers to provide better protection during the night, but CTG 77.6 believed it would be too difficult to collect them all in one place.

1837 - LEUTZE reported to Comdesron 60 as supporting ship for the minesweepers, upon orders from CTG 77.2. Comdesron 60 advised CTG 77.6 that LEUTZE would remain with the BARTON in view of present conditions. The BRYANT also reported to Comdesron 60 and was ordered to relieve the ARUNTA which returned to TG 77.2.

     Considerable AA fire was observed coming from TG 77.2, and several planes were seen to be shot down.

1900 - Ordered BARTON to take station on port bow and LEUTZE on starboard bow if the 5 YMS in column, and commenced retirement on course 340訊, speed 8 knots.

     A few bogies were reported after darkness fell, but no further attacks were observed.

7 January 1945.

0100 - c/c 160訊.

0143 - The BARTON made surface radar contact with target bearing 098訊, 22,000 yards. The target was about 5 miles off the coast of LUZON, between SANTA CRUZ and TAGUDIN, and was proceeding north at 8 knots.

0150 - LEUTZE reported she had a target also.

0202 - Comdesron 60 ordered BARTON and LEUTZE to attack target. The LEUTZE took station on port beam of BARTON and both ships proceeded at 25 knots to close the range.

0230 - Speed was reduced to 15 knots.

0232 - The BARTON reported jamming of Mark 12 radar on 940 mcs, 15 either side of target bearing. (See Part VI).

0238 - Ordered ships to open fire with range 7000 yards, as the target turned toward beach.

0241 - The target was reported by both ships to be dead in water. By this time the target was identified as a small patrol craft, similar in type to our PC's.

0248 - The target, although dead in water, opened fire on the BARTON with machine guns. Firing was very inaccurate.

0251 - LEUTZE reported two targets believed to be PT boats approaching very rapidly from the beach. This was a radar contact.

0253 - Comdesron 60 ordered both ships to increase speed to 25 knots and open out toward the minesweepers. No other targets could be seen on screen.

0254 - The patrol boat target disappeared from the screens of both ships simultaneously, and the LEUTZE reported that the new targets were false echoes. The enemy PC boat apparently sank, but could not be confirmed visually.

0345 - Comdesron 60, with BARTON and LEUTZE, rejoined MinRon 10.

0452 - Observed AA fire in the vicinity of the heavy ships and a large explosion which appeared to be plane crashing ship.

0730 - Observed TG 77.2 under attack by suicide planes.

0800 - Entered LINGAYEN GULF with minesweepers and continued sweeping operations in area near beach between ARINGAY PT. and SAN FERNANDO PT.

0830 - Comdesron 60 directed LEUTZE to take station 1000 yards astern of BARTON and follow BARTON's movements to provide mutual support in the event of air attack.

0955 - Observed AA batteries near PORO POINT firing on carrier planes in the vicinity.

     During afternoon observed further dive bombing and attacks by rocket planes on enemy installations south of SAN FERNANDO. About 30 planes were seen in attack on AA batteries on PORO POINT.

1840 - Observed enemy plane approaching minesweeping group to the westward. Plane dropped bomb on PALMER (DMS), bomb exploded and PALMER sank in a very short time. The plane dived very low on the ship before releasing bomb, but did not try to crash. It pulled up out of its dive, but was shot down by AA fire of the other ships in group immediately, and crashed into the water.

1843 - Commenced retirement with minesweepers from LINGAYEN GULF on course 345訊, speed 8 knots, in same disposition as previous night.

8 January 1945.

0100 - Reversed course to 165訊 to return to LINGAYEN GULF.

0344 - The BARTON reported sound contact, but contact disappeared before attack could be made. A thorough search of area was made for one hour, but no further contacts developed. Contact classified as non-sub.

0530 - BARTON rejoined minesweepers, who had been diverted to the westward during the BARTON's sound search.

1325 - BARTON sank two small mines with 40 mm. fire which had been swept by sweepers.

1350 - Observed attack by group of LCI(G) on SAN FERNANDO beach, which set several enemy landing craft afire.

1712 - CTU 77.2.1 was preparing to bombard the SAN FERNANDO-PORO POINT area again. Comdesron 60 ordered the minesweepers to expedite clearing the area for this operation.

1730 - Comdesron 60 ordered LEUTZE to report to CTG 77.2.

1735 - MinRon 10 completed sweep of assigned area.

1744 - Since the assignment with minesweepers was completed, Comdesron 60 reported to CTU 77.2.1, then proceeding north toward PORO POINT. TU 77.2.1 heavy ships were in column. Comdesron 60 ordered the BARTON to take station ahead of the column, O'BRIEN astern, and other ships of Desron 60 1000 yards to seaward equally spaced.

1810 - Heavy ships commenced bombardment.

1840 - Completed bombardment and heavy ships recovered spotting planes.

 1915 - Formed circular screen about heavy ships of TU 77.2.1.

1921 - The LAFFEY departed from screen to carry out night harassing fire mission.

2100 - TU 77.2.1 proceeded to join TU 72.2.2 in LINGAYEN GULF. Units of TU 77.2.1 commenced to take stations in disposition 5R0 one at a time.

2240 - A 25 ship screen was formed, and ComDesRon 60 relieved ComDesRon 56 as screen commander. Desron 60 ships assigned as follows: BARTON 1, O'BRIEN 4, WALKE 8, ALLEN M. SUMNER 5, LOWRY 9, MOALE 11. Axis 000, course 160訊.

2242 - Ordered ComDesRon 56 to check positions in forward sector of screen. At this time TG 77.2 was being crowded by TF 78 which had entered the Gulf and lay to the westward. Several minesweeping groups proceeding northward out of gulf were also interfering with movements. One group of five sweeps passed through disposition at 2249.

2303 - H. L. EDWARDS was ordered to divert other minesweeping groups to the eastward. However, one column was already within the screen and also passed completely through disposition.

9 January 1945.

0345 - CTG 77.2 ordered all units to proceed with scheduled operation. Bombardment units proceeded to assigned stations. The BARTON, MOALE, INGRAHAM and WALKE screened the NEW MEXICO and MINNEAPOLIS to northward on left flank of SAN FABIAN BEACH and BARTON was assigned counterbattery fire on the north flank.

0618 - Enemy planes were reported over the area and several reports of bombs dropped were received with no apparent damage.

0636 - Enemy plane dropped bombs near BARTON which narrowly missed the NEW MEXICO and MINNEAPOLIS.

0650 - The BARTON sighted and opened fire on an enemy twin-engine bomber which came in over shipping area from land to the southeast. It was difficult to pick out the plane in the twilight, but the BARTON's alertness enabled other ships in the area to get on target. Combined AA fire finally drove the plane off with no apparent damage.

0704 - Heavy ships commenced bombardment in all areas, and the landing craft formed up for the assault.

0716 - BARTON was again the first ship to open fire on an enemy plane which flew over the area at about 5 or 6000 feet. Immediately after BARTON opened fire, the sky was soon covered with a mass of AA bursts. The plane seemed to escape damage although it was continually blanketed by the volume of fire. However, it apparently could not close to make a bombing or diving attack and was driven off.

0730 - Troops in transports commenced loading into assault craft.

0748 - Observed AA fire near LINGAYEN beachhead, and bombs dropped by plane. Received report from COLUMBIA that ship had been hit by a suicide plane for third time, but was continuing bombardment.

0949 - Received report that the first waves had landed meeting no opposition.

1305 - Observed AA fire from near LINGAYEN beach. Received report that AUSTRALIA had been hit for fourth time by suicide plane.

1423 - Landing craft on White Beach under fire by Jap Mortar. This gun taken under fire by two unidentified destroyers and quickly silenced.

1540 - The MOALE was ordered to replenish ammo from an LST by CTG 77.2.

1650 - CTU 77.2.1 received orders for the NEW MEXICO to knock out a bridge at ARINGAY, south of SAN FERNANDO, and ordered ComDesRon 60 to screen the NEW MEXICO with the BARTON and MOALE.

1651 - Informed CTU 77.2.1 that MOALE was replenishing ammo and was ordered to replace MOALE with WALKE.

1700 - NEW MEXICO, BARTON and WALKE proceeded to area assigned to knock out bridge.

1715 - The SUMNER and O'BRIEN were ordered to report to CTF 79 for assignment by CTG 77.2. It was the intention to include all damaged ships in first returning convoy.

1732 - Informed CTU 77.2.1 that a message had been intercepted directing WALKE to report to CTF 79, and WALKE was ordered to return to the southern area to carry out CTG 77.2's instructions.

1750 - The NEW MEXICO commenced firing on designated bridge.

1810 - CTF 79 ordered ALLEN M. SUMNER, O'BRIEN and WALKE to remain in transport area until receipt of further orders.

1830 - NEW MEXICO completed firing, recovered spotting plane, and commenced return to gulf.

1841 - Observed destroyers on picket station attacked by enemy suicide plane. Plane attempted to crash one of the ships but was hit repeatedly by AA fire and crashed into the water.

1900 - Sighted enemy plane at high altitude and out of gun range heading for the main shipping area. Considerable AA fire was directed at this plane, which continued on southerly course and was attacked by a P-61 as it passed over the beach.

1920 - Four enemy planes reported in area, two over beachhead, and two in the vicinity of the BARTON. One missed a destroyer (BENNION) with a bomb as it passed the BARTON about 1000 yards on the port beam.

1940 - NEW MEXICO proceeded to join TG 77.2 and ComDesRon 60 was released to effect fueling operations scheduled for the night.

2010 - Ordered LAFFEY, MOALE, INGRAHAM to remain in vicinity of Point "Easy" until fueling arrangements could be completed.

2125 - Made further request for fueling assignment from CTF 78.

2320 - Obtained fueling arrangements from the commander of a Transport Division, and ordered BARTON, INGRAHAM and MOALE to go alongside for fuel.

10 January 1945.

0000 - A LST reported being hit by torpedo from an enemy MTB.

0400 - Enemy MTB's were again reported to be in the shipping area and two more ships were hit with torpedoes. One other ship reported that small boats approached and grenades had been thrown onto the ship.

0500 - CTF 79 ordered all unloading operations and movements of small boats to cease. Any small boat detected approaching a ship was to be fired upon.

0630 - The BARTON, MOALE, and INGRAHAM completed fueling, rendezvoused at Point "Easy" and proceeded to join TG 77.2 at northern end of gulf. The LOWRY, having completed a fire support mission, also joined.

0713 - A Jap "Val" was sighted overhead and taken under fire by all ships in vicinity. The plane attempted to suicide crash, but missed the SAUFLEY (DD465) by about 200 yards.

0745 - Directed LAFFEY and MOALE to screen the MINNEAPOLIS during fire support mission.

0800 - Joined TG 77.2 with BARTON, INGRAHAM, and LOWRY, and took up screening stations as TG 77.2 proceeded to return to southern area of gulf.

0801 - CTG 77.2 ordered Comdesron 60 to complete fueling operations as soon as possible.

0930 - Attempted to obtain ammo from LST's, but one LST reported that it was ordered to supply cruisers only, and the other LST was being used by Desron 56. Units of Desron 60 and Desron 56 not fueling continued to screen heavy ships north of LINGAYEN beach.

0946 - Two JAPANESE midget submarines reported in area near western end of beach by the BELKNAP. On was sunk, and the BELKNAP reported she also killed several JAP swimmers with explosives strapped to their backs.

1107 - The CONEY was ordered to assist the BELKNAP in search for JAP suicide swimmers. The swimmers would attempt to approach ships under cover of floating boxes or other debris.

1320 - The SMITH reported a number of JAP swimmers attempting to swim out toward transports, and several APD's and DD's were despatched to the area to assist in rounding them up.

 1500 - The LAFFEY and MOALE completed fueling. Ordered the MOALE to replace LOWRY in fire support mission for the night.

1700 - TG 77.2 formed disposition 5R0-1 in accordance with reference (d). Comdesron 60 ordered Desron 60 and Desron 56 to form a 14 ship screen with the following station assignments clockwise: BARTON, IZARD, BRYANT, PORTER, LEUTZE, NEWCOMB, H. L. EDWARDS, LEARY, BENNION, WARRAMUNGA, KIMBERLY, INGRAHAM, LOWRY, LAFFEY.

1831 - The EDWARDS and COGHLAN reported to Comdesron 60 for screening assignments.

1840 - CTG 77.2 ordered Comdesron 60 to recall the MOALE from inner area to rejoin disposition.

1919 - Observed enemy plane making suicide attack on returning convoy and crash the DuPAGE (APA).

1947 - Formed 17 ship screen on circle 6 with following order clockwise: BARTON, IZARD, BRYANT, W. P. PORTER, KIMBERLY, LEUTZE, NEWCOMB, H. L. EDWARDS, BENNION, R. P. LEARY, WARRAMUNGA, MOALE, COGHLAN, EDWARDS, INGRAHAM, LOWRY, LAFFEY.

2320 - BOISE, EDWARDS, COGHLAN, departed from TG 77.2, while TG 77.2 continued on northwesterly courses to rendezvous with TG 77.4 and the screen was reduced to 15 stations.

11 January 1945.

0735 - CTG 77.2 ordered CTU 77.2.1 to join TU 77.4.2 operating 8 miles to the westward.

0745 - Ordered Desron 60 to screen NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI, WEST VIRGINIA, and MINNEAPOLIS during transit to TU 77.4.2.

0905 - Formed disposition 4R0 with 14 ship screen on circle 6, axis 000訊, with stations clockwise as follows: BARTON, LAFFEY, INGRAHAM, HALL, PAUL HAMILTON, ABBOT, EDWARDS, BELL, BURNS, TWIGGS, H. F. CLARK, WARRAMUNGA, KIMBERLY, MOALE. The disposition was composed of 3 BB, 1 CA, 6 CVE, 13 DD, and 4 DE.

1025 - J. C. BUTLER (DE 399) and O'FLAHERTY (DE 340) reported for duty and were assigned stations 12 and 9 respectively.

1457 - CTU 77.4.2 requested that a destroyer be detailed to carry out a rescue mission of pilots downed near BADOC ISLAND on the northwest coast of LUZON. The LAFFEY was designated and Comdesron 60 strongly recommended that another DD be sent along also. CTU 77.2.1 concurred wit this recommendation and the KIMBERLY was ordered to accompany the LAFFEY. The rescue point was about 80 miles away and very close to LUZON coast. About 20-30 enemy luggers and coastal vessels were reported by a Dumbo in the same general area. Rescue had been attempted by the Dumbo, but sea conditions were too rough for the plane to land with any degree of safety.

1517 - Formed 14 ship screen during absence of the LAFFEY and KIMBERLY.

2230 - LAFFEY reported area had been thoroughly searched for several hours with negative results.

12 January 1945.

0453 - CTU 77.4.2 designated OTC.

0600 - CTU 77.4.2 directed screen to take stations for disposition 5RN. Ordered MOALE and WARRAMUNGA to exchange stations as WARRAMUNGA had no "dishpan" lights.

0615 - Carriers commenced flight operations.

0715 - Ordered LAFFEY and KIMBERLY to resume original stations in screen (Nos. 3 and 4 respectively) upon return from rescue mission, and expanded screen to 16 stations.

0815 - Commenced fueling operations.

1455 - The H. L. EDWARDS and PAUL HAMILTON were designated to proceed to rendezvous with two tankers (TALLULAH and SCHUYLKILL) which were enroute to TG 77.2 from TG 77.3.

1535 - MOALE reported a sound contact and CTU 77.4.2 executed "emergency turn 9". The O'FLAHERTY was sent to assist the MOALE in the search and a VF plane was assigned by CTU 77.4.2. However, no further contact was established, and the MOALE and O'FLAHERTY proceeded to rejoin at 1820. Contact was classified as non-sub by MOALE.

1715 - CTG 77.2 ordered CTU 77.2.1 to clear present disposition, and TG 77.2 to reform disposition 5R0-1 on the CALIFORNIA as guide, with axis 330訊.

1730 - Completed fueling operations for the day.

1745 - Ordered Desron 60 to form screen 56 on NEW MEXICO, while rejoining TU 72.2.2 with MISSISSIPPI, WEST VIRGINIA, and MINNEAPOLIS. Ordered the HALLIGAN to assume temporary command of TU 77.4.2 screen and Comdesron 56 to maintain the present sceen until Comdesron 60 joined.

1940 - Disposition 5R0-1 formed. The screen was stationed on circle 5 with the BARTON on the axis and order clockwise of BARTON, IZARD, BRYANT, W. D. PORTER, LEUTZE, NEWCOMB, BENNION, R. P. LEARY, WARRAMUNGA, MOALE, KIMBERLY, INGRAHAM, LOWRY, LAFFEY.

13 January 1945.

0610 - CTU 77.4.1 and CTU 77.4.2 assumed tactical command of their groups and commenced flight opeations.

0800 - H. L. EDWARDS, with two tankers, rejoined disposition for fueling operations which commenced immediately.

1250 - CTG 77.2 ordered fueling operations to cease upon receipt of a bogey report. The plane was later identified as friendly and fueling resumed at 1550.

1433 - The W. D. PORTER picked up a pilot who had made a crash landing.

1845 - Completed fueling operations. Formed 16 ship screen with same order as before, adding the EDWARDS in station 13 between the NEWCOMB and BENNION, and the LOESER in station 14 between the LEARY and WARRAMUNGA.

1942 - Order screen to take station on circle 6.

14 January 1945.

0715 - Commenced fueling operations.

1503 - LOWRY picked up survivors from a HOGGATT BAY plane.

1655 - The HARMON (DE 658) reported to Comdesron 60 for duty.

1705 - Formed 17 station screen with same order clockwise, HARMON taking station 14 between the WARRAMUNGA and LOESER.

1832 - LAFFEY, LOWRY, and H. L. EDWARDS were designated by CTG 77.2 to accompany ComBatDiv 4 to LINGAYEN GULF.

2111 - Comdesron 60 suggested to CTG 77.2 that screen be moved in to circle 5, upon departure of ComBatDiv 4.

2215 - CTG 77.2 ordered ComBatDiv 4 to depart at 0230, and Comdesron 60 ordered screen to form 12 station screen when this order was executed.

15 January 1945.

0230 - WEST VIRGINIA, COLORADO, LAFFEY, LOWRY, H. L. EDWARDS, HARMON, LOESER, and three tankers (CHEPATCHET, TALLULAH, and WINOOSKI) departed for LINGAYEN GULF to replenish ammunition. Formed a 12 ship screen with remaining destroyers.

0310 - Remaining heavy ships moved to circle 1.5 and screen to circle 5.

0610 - Carrier groups commenced flight operations.

0715 - Formed disposition 4R0 with TU 77.2.1 and TU 77.4.2. The screen consisted of the BARTON, INGRAHAM, KOMBERLY, MOALE, WARRAMUNGA, HALLIGAN, TWIGGS, BURNS, BELL, ABBOT, PAUL HAMILTON, HALL (12 DD's); EDWARDS, O'FLAHERTY, J. C. BUTLER, H. F. CLARK (4 DE). Disposition formed on axis 000訊, with CVE's on circle 2, heavy ships circle 3 and screen circle 6.

     Carriers conducted flight operations throughout the day, being hampered considerably by heavy swells and seas and winds of about 25 knots.

1700 - Upon orders from CTG 77.2, TU 77.2.1 proceeded to join TU 72.2.2 to form disposition 5R0-1. The screen consisted of BARTON (CDS 60), INGRAHAM, KIMBERLY, MOALE, WARRAMUNGA, R. P. LEARY, BENNION, NEWCOMB (CDS 56), LEUTZE, W. D. PORTER, BRYANT (12 DD).

     Disposition formed on axis 330訊, CALIFORNIA guide at fleet center, heavy ships on circle 1.5, screen in above order clockwise on circle 5 with BARTON in station 1.

16 January 1945.

0700 - Formed disposition 4R0 with TU 77.2.1 and TU 77.4.2 on axis 000訊, course 030訊. All stations remained the same as on the previous day.

1710 - TU 77.2.1 proceeded to join TU 77.2.2 to form disposition 5R0-1, stations remaining the same as those of the morning.

17 January 1945.

0725 - ComBatDiv 4 reported to CTG 77.2.2

0727 - Ordered the screen to expand to 15 stations with order same as 1745, 12 January, plus the EDWARDS in station 13 between the NEWCOMB and BENNION.

1222 - KIMBERLY, INGRAHAM, and EDWARDS designated to accompany ComBatDiv 3 in NEW MEXICO with PENNSYLVANIA to LINGAYEN GULF. The LEUTZE was designated to replace EDWARDS temporarily until the latter completed receiving passengers from TG 77.4.

1258 - ComBatDiv 3 with ships assigned departed for LINGAYEN GULF.

1305 - Formed 11 ship screen with the same order clockwise as before, less LEUTZE, EDWARDS, KIMBERLY and INGRAHAM.

2200 - c/c 155訊 and proceeded toward LINGAYEN GULF.

18 January 1945.

0500 - Passed Point "Irk" at entrance to Gulf.

0725 - Assigned ships of screen to anchorage berths, screening heavy ships to the east and north of area "E".

0747 - CTG 77.2 ordered ships to proceed to anchorages independently.


PART IV - ORDNANCE


A.   OWN ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT.

     1.     The few gunnery casualties that occurred in the destroyers of the Bombardment and Fire Support Group are included in the enclosed reports from ships of Desron 60, and in ComDesRon 56's report forwarded separately.

     2.     In general AA fire against suicide planes is not as effective as desired, particularly against planes diving at high angles, where a vital control surface of the aircraft must be blown off to deflect the plane from its course. With present equipment, only continuous alertness on the part of all hands on the topside, coupled with development of a maximum rate of fire from all batteries and evasive maneuvers, can offer a solution. Experience thus far has indicated that a large percentage of Mark 32 fuzed projectiles should be used against suicide planes, provided they are not fired over own ships.

     3.     Fire discipline was fair, but there were two or three occasions where ships in the disposition were fired upon accidentally by others. Positive control of fire is essential, yet firing over own ships for mutual support against suicide planes is advocated. It has been done successfully in previous operations at ORMOC and MINDORO.

     4.    It was obvious that the 20 mm. batteries on destroyers were of little or no use against suicide planes. Heavier batteries must be used against such planes, and since it appears that suicide attacks will continue until JAPAN is defeated, the addition of more 40 mm. mounts on destroyers at the expense of 20 mm. mounts is desirable.

     5.     Ammunition expended by destroyers of Bombardment and Fire Support Unit (See Table).


AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

(1) All purpose.
5" Common
& 5"/Mk 18
5"/Mk 32
& Mk 40
5"/Star 5"/WP 40 MM 20 MM
BARTON 437 54 2 1234 2000
WALKE 122 71 1776 1800
LAFFEY 715 69 28 974 1335
O'BRIEN 1108 98 1041 924
SUMNER --1334--(Total 5") 1760 1235
MOALE 732 16 14 877 2700
INGRAHAM 838 181 10 6 1860 720
LOWRY 1219 108 23 3 2300 2000
WARRAMUNGA (4.7" and 4" not available)
ARUNTA (4.7" and 4" not available)
(2) Shore Bombardment.
BARTON None
WALKE None
LAFFEY 604 28 16
O'BRIEN None
SUMNER 752 224
MOALE 275 16 14
INGRAHAM 184 10 5
LOWRY 1065 23 3 600
WARRAMUNGA Not available
ARUNTA Not available
(3) AA Action.
BARTON 237 54 1234 2000
WALKE 122 71 1776 1800
LAFFEY 111 69 958 1335
O'BRIEN 1108 98 1041 924
SUMNER --582-- 1536 1235
MOALE 457 877 2700
INGRAHAM 654 1860 720
LOWRY 154 108 1700 2000
WARRAMUNGA (Not available)
ARUNTA (Not available)
(4) Surface.
BARTON 200 2

B. ENEMY ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT.

     1.     Enemy bombing by usual methods was poor. Insofar as known, only the PALMER (APD) was struck by a bomb.

     2.     Fire from enemy shore batteries was generally ineffective, what little was encountered. The heavy caliber fire from the vicinity of PORO POINT on the SAN FABIAN Fire Support Group was accurate in range, but off in deflection, and was of insufficient volume.

     3.     Enemy surface ship 40 mm. fire from an enemy PC was accurate in range, but off in deflection. This occurred at night, and it is believed the enemy was using ranges and bearings obtained from radar.

     4.     Enemy suicide crash planes were very effective, with a high percentage of hits.


PART V


A.   The following ships of Desron 60 were damaged:

     1.     WARRAMUNGA - sustained while transferring personnel to PENNSYLVANIA
            (a) Two holes, 2/5 and 3/3 between frames 9 and 12.
            (b) Minor buckling of frame and plates from stem to frame 24.

     2.     O'BRIEN - crashed by suicide plane.
            (a) Hole 15X10 feet in vicinity of frame 196. Compartments C205, C311V, C308A, C208AL flooded.
            (b) Degaussing gear and depth charge rack damaged.

     3.     WALKE - crashed by suicide plane on bridge structure.
            (a) Main battery and torpedo directors, 2 forward Mk. 51 directors badly damaged.
            (b) Mark 12 and SC radars minor damage.
            (c) All radio equipment except TBL, MAN inoperative.
            (d) Considerable damage to structure of pilot house and sea cabin.

     4.     SUMNER - crashed by suicide plane.
            (a) Mount 3 and 44 damaged.
            (b) After torpedo mount and two 20 mm. guns demolished.
            (c) Fire in No. 3 magazine which necessitated flooding.
            (d) Eight foot hole in main deck at frame 158.
            (e) Compartment 203 flooded with water, oil, and debris.
            (f) Degaussing out.

     5.     ARUNTA - near miss by suicide plane.
            (a) Numerous small holes and several large holes in port side near waterline abreast the mainmast.
            (b) Break in main steam line.

B.   Battle Damage to enemy units.

     1.     One patrol vessel attacked and probably sunk by BARTON and LEUTZE on night 6-7 January.

     2.     Indeterminable damage to shore gun positions and installations.

     3.     Approximately 56 enemy planes observed destroyed by AA fire of screen or crashes. (See appendix 1 to this part)

     4.     Ships of Desron 60 alone definitely accounted for 10 planes and assisted in the destruction of 6 others. The ships of Desron 60 are credited with shooting down the following number of ships:

            WALKE        - 4
            BARTON      - 2
            INGRAHAM - 1


PART V - Appendix 1

SUMMARY OF ENEMY AIR ATTACKS OBSERVED BY DESTROYERS OF
TG 77.2 AND PLANES SEEN DESTROYED


Time

No. and Type

AA

CAP

Crashed Ship
3 Jan.
1903 1 1
4 Jan.
0345 2
1712 1 1
1717 1 1 (OMMANEY BAY)
1728-54 4 (Vals)
5 Jan.
0330 1+ 1 (O'BRIEN & LAFFEY)
1047 1 1 (Judy)
1611 2
1655 3 3
1712 2+ 1 1 (LOUISVILLE)
1741 1 (Val) 1
1748 4-6 (2 Judy) 1 (MANILA BAY)
1 (STAFFORD)
1 (AUSTRALIA)
1 (HELM)
1809 1 1
1918 1+
1930 1+
6 Jan.

0255

1+ (Dropped bomb near LOWRY)
0310-0320 3
0400-0430 1
0543 2 1
0607 1+
0710 1
0732 1 1 (INGRAHAM)
0750 2 (Vals) (1 dropped bombs)
0807 1+ 1
1120 3
1124-1127 2
1130-1135 1 (Zeke)
1147 3-4
1152 1 1 1
1158 8-10 (4 Zekes) 3 (WALKE) 1 (SUMNER)
1 (WALKE)
1 (NEW MEXICO)
1209 3 2 (1 MOALE & LOWRY)
1249 1 (Hamp)
1431 2 1 (BARTON) 1 (O'BRIEN)
1436 3 (Judys) 1
1442 3 1
1501 1 1 (BARTON)
1620 2 (Irving) 1
1628 3
1720 3+ 1 (CALIFORNIA)
1 (LOUISVILLE)
1725-30 1+ (1 Val) 1 (AUSTRALIA)
1733 3 1
1740-52 5 (Vals) 1 (PORTER) 1 (COLUMBIA)
1755 1 (Judy)
1757 2 1
1803 1 1
1830 1 1 (SHROPSHIRE)
7 Jan.
0425 1+
0534 1+
0732 1+
1831 1+
1840 1 1 (Bombed & sank PALMER)
1903 1
1910 1 (Jake)
1915 1 (Jake)
1958 1
8 Jan.
0510 1+
0630 1+
0644 1+
0718 1 (Betty) 1 (AUSTRALIA)
0733 1 (Nick) 1 (AUSTRALIA)
1856 1+
9 Jan.
0535 1
0632 1 (Dropped bombs)
0640 1 (Dropped bombs)
0655 1
0715 1
0748 2 1 1 (COLUMBIA)
1308 3 1 1 (MISSISSIPPI)
1 (AUSTRALIA)
1744 1
1825 1 (Val)
1840 1 1
1855 2 1
1903 1
1915 1
1925 1+
2005 1+ 1
10 Jan.
0600 2
0710 1 (Zeke) 1
0800 1 (Oscar) 1
1822 1 1 (Moale)
1902 1 (Val) 1
1917 1+ 1 (DUPAGE)

TOTALS

139

38

3

19


PART VI


D.

     1.     While engaged in screening a minesweeping unit on the night of 7 January 1945, the U.S.S. BARTON experienced what was possible deliberate jamming of the Mark 12 fire control radar.

     2.     At 0143, 7 January, while on station on course 160訊 in Lat. 17-27'N, Long. 120-24'E, the BARTON made contact with an unidentified surface vessel bearing 099訊, range 21,900 yds, on the SG-1 radar. Tracking gave a target course of 000訊, speed 10 knots. Upon training the director on the target bearing, it was found that tracking was impossible because of what appeared to be noise modulated CW jamming. The jamming signal is believed to have been sufficiently strong to prevent tracking any targets that might be within 15 on either side of the target bearing.

     3.     The "threshold range" was approximately 10,000 yds, and though the jamming signal was still as strong at this range, accurate tracking was possible at all ranges less than 10,000 yards. At 0238, when the range was 7,000 yds, the order o commence firing was given. The SG-1 showed a straddle on the first salvo, but it is believed that the first hit was obtained on the fourth or fifth salvo at which time the jamming suddenly ceased completely and was not seen again. There was no apparent change of jamming signal strength at any time.

     4.     During the entire approach the enemy craft appeared unaware of our presence since he maintained a constant course and speed and executed no evasive maneuvers until two minutes prior to opening fire, when he executed a sharp 90 turn to the right, toward the beach. The means by which our approach was discovered by the enemy vessel is not known. Though the BARTON at no time observed the target visually, until after fire had been opened, it is believed that it might have been possible for the enemy vessel to see the phosphorescent wakes of the  BARTON and LEUTZE at ranges up to 7,000 or 8,000 yds. It is also possible that the enemy was tracking the two ships during the entire approach, using radar whose frequency was the same as the MK 12 or a sub-multiple of the Mk 12 frequency.

     5.     The BARTON's Mark 12 radar was operating normally before and after the engagement. The TBS (77.1 mcs) and MN (30.14 mcs) were used intermittently for communications between the BARTON and LEUTZE. However, no VHF radio interference has been encountered by the BARTON's Mark 12, which operates at 940 mcs. The Mark 12 on the BARTON was the only radar on either ship effected by jamming. Tracking was possible using the SG-1 and Mark 22.

     6.     The anti-jam filter incorporated in the Mark 12 had no effect and no additional information on the band width of the jamming signal could be obtained from the intercept receiver, since the Mark 12 signal at the BARTON entirely blocked out any other signals present near 940 mcs. During the jamming the U.S.S. LEUTZE who investigated the contact with the BARTON, was on the BARTON's port bow at a range from 1000 to 1500 yards and showed up on the Mark 12 indicator scope as a pip from a side lobe. Saturation land echoes were received at all times from land beyond the target as shown in enclosure (A).

2. Communication.
     (A) Radio.
          (1) VHF Voice Maneuvering and Administrative Circuits.
                At times, the TBS circuit was greatly overcrowded and at other times, when the pressure was off, it functioned perfectly. The night of S-5 when the OMMANEY BAY (CVE 79) was sunk, on S Day, and on S plus one, it was an ineffective circuit because of interference and lack of circuit discipline. Congestion on the primary TBS channel (72.1 mcs) was increased because the higher commands used it for traffic between themselves. Inasmuch as most battleships, cruisers, and communication ships have two TBS sets, the congestion could have been reduced had the task group commanders used one of the secondary TBS frequencies for high command communications, when practicable, and reserved the primary channel for maneuvering and for urgent traffic of ships equipped with only one TBS.
               This secondary, or high command TBS channel, could be used for either voice or MCW transmissions. At one time on the night of S-5 the primary TBS channel was used to send an MCW message to 2 commands which prevented the circuit from being used for maneuvering. This message might better have been sent on the task group common, 441 kcs, as there was no question of keeping the position of the force a secret; the Japs had already attacked and knew its location.
               It is recommended therefore that task force and task group commanders use, in addition to the TBS primary for maneuvering and warning, a TBS secondary frequency for purely high command traffic.
               The TBS load on S Day, and subsequent to that time, could have been reduced by using the task group common, 441 kcs CW, for plain language administrative traffic which was being sent on 72.1 mcs. No question of security was involved because all ships were in Lingayen Gulf and the reports were going in plain language on TBS and the fleet common, 34.8 mcs. It is realized that the employment of the TG common for messages of this type is contrary to its primary purpose, but the circuit could easily be cleared if there was operational traffic to send. As it was, not more than twenty operational messages were sent on 441 kcs in sixteen days. A few commands did use 441 kcs to clear administrative plain language traffic when the circuit was dead, which was about 90% of the time.
               The fleet common, 34.8 mcs, was continuously overcrowded. There were too many stations on one frequency, and most of the time it was impossible to get a message either in or out. Circuit discipline was poor; excessive delays and repetitions, were caused by stations cutting in on other station's transmissions. This was due in part, however, to the use of a frequency unsuited for distance involved.
               The MN (30.14 mcs) was the best voice circuit for destroyers. It was not overcrowded, procedure was good, and the MN equipment functioned perfectly. It is considered that the MN transceiver is the finest VHF voice radio equipment being issued today. This circuit was used by destroyers and minesweepers exclusively, and was used in preference to the TBS when addressees had the equipment and the condition of radio silence did not prohibit its use.
              Three ships of Destroyer Squadron 60 do not have MN as no units were available at Pearl Harbor last October. This produced an awkward situation and necessitated use of TBS for delivery to those ships. All ships of a squadron should be equipped with similar equipment.
               The one unfortunate characteristic of the MN is its frequency, which is too low for required security. Use of frequencies 30-60 mcs is usually prohibited at sea which leaves destroyers with no screening circuit. Screen commanders often control as many as twenty-five or more ships and a clear VHF voice channel must be provided if the tactical effectiveness of the screen is to be maintained. The present MN does not fulfill this urgent need because of its low frequency. If all potential screening ships, including DD, DE, APS, and YMS, were equipped with MN, and if the MN frequency lay between 60 and 100 mcs, it would be a satisfactory set.
              It is recommended that either the MN frequency be increased so that it lies between 60-100 mcs, or that another transmitter receiver unit, multiple channel crystal controlled, for screening ships be developed which has a frequency in this range. This is an urgent problem.

          (2) High Frequency Voice Circuits. The usual difficulties were experienced with HF voice circuits; receivers and transmitters were not tuned carefully and in some cases apparently were not monitored by an operator. Most HF voice circuits are remote controlled and access to the receiver and the circuit talker impossible. All HF voice circuits should be carefully monitored at the receiver by a competent radioman who understands that not all stations cone in on exactly the same frequency and who knows how to use RF and AF gain controls.
               Operators on the gunfire control net showed commendable initiative in relaying for stations unable to contact each other direct.
               2716 kcs voice, the Hydrographic and Minesweeping Common, was an unfortunate choice because of interference experienced both day and night from ships in Leyte Gulf about 350 miles distant airline. Signals from Leyte Gulf were S5 at times and average S2-3. It is probable that interference was experienced in Leyte from ships taking part in M-1.

             The LAW frequency at the objective area (3115 kcs) was not used for that purpose until about S plus three. All information on bogeys in the BARTON was obtained by intercepting the IFD circuit (2595 kcs)
              It is recommended that in the initial phases of a landing, ships with limited radio equipment listen to the IFD circuit instead of the LAW until such time as the latter is used for its intended purpose.
               A number of ships transmitted on the NGF Control (Lingayen) frequency (3905 kcs) and the LAW frequency (3115 kcs) to communicate with task group commanders when out of TBS range, and often these two circuits proved invaluable. Example: when USS BARTON (DD 722), squadron leader of Commander Destroyer Squadron 60, while covering the minesweepers, underwent two suicide plane attacks in forty-five minutes on S-3 Day, air cover was requested from CTG 77.2 by an urgent voice message on the NGF Control frequency (3905 kcs) and approximately twenty minutes latter a CAP was on station.
               When equipment permits it is recommended that a TG common HF voice circuit be established (some frequency between 2500 kcs and 4500 kcs) guarded continuously by all task force group commanders, on which ships out of TBS, MAN, or MN range can contact these commanders in an emergency, or for more important administrative messages. This would leave NGF common and LAW frequencies free for their primary purpose.
          (3) CW Circuits. Certain ships continue to keep careless watches on low frequency task group common frequencies. In some instances ships a mile away had to be notified by voice that they were being called on 441 kcs.
              On S Day destroyers of TG 77.2 assigned the San Fabian Fire Support Unit TU 77.2.1 were required to guard both the TG 77.2 common, 441 kcs, and the TF 79 common, 469.5 kcs. This was unnecessary duplication and placed extra burden on the already overloaded destroyers. No traffic was ever received on 469.5 kcs. It is recommended that in the future destroyers be required to guard only one LF TG common frequency.
               There is a definite need for a VHF MCW channel with a range similar to that of the TBS, while on larger ships the secondary "TBS" can be used on MCW, the transmitter is not designated primarily for this type of emission and overheating results. Destroyers have no set to ose on VHF MCW.
               It is recommended that a VHF transmitter and receiver for MCW be developed and placed on all ships of the DE type and larger. This circuit would be used to parallel voice maneuvering signals, handle flash reports in carrier task forces and administrative traffic. While it may not be possible to make this equipment available at this time, it would be a valuable addition to communication material in the future.

               Fox schedule. Reception of the Manus Fox was generally good and very few numbers were missed. It was necessary to split-phone Manus the entire time to insure good copy. It will be a great help to Seventh Fleet ships when a powerful broadcast station is established in the Philippine Islands.

               Enemy Jamming. No enemy jamming was experienced, and although Japanese stations were heard several times on the MN (30.14 mcs), they caused no disruption in communications.

              Circuit Discipline and Authentication. Voice circuit discipline left much to be desired, the most frequent offense being cutting in on another station's transmission. The most notable example of the occurred the afternoon of S plus one when the BELKNAP (APD 34) sighted Jap suicide swimmers with dynamite strapped to their backs heading for the transport area. The BELKNAP transmitted several warning messages on TBS which were cut out by a ship making a fuel report.
               Authentication on CW and voice circuits was surprisingly good which seems to indicate that the recent campaign pointing out the necessity for proper authentication has been effective.

          (4) Communication Material. The MAN transmitter-receiver unit, is not considered satisfactory. It is battery operated and the average life of a fully charged battery is 5-6 hours. In heavy weather it is dangerous to carry the heavy wet batteries from the charging compartment on the starboard side of the main deck to the MAN unit in the sound hut. At one time during the operation this was done with the ship rolling an average of 35.
               It is strongly recommended that a power pack which operates from ship's power (and connected to emergency power, with batteries as a stand-by) be supplied to all ships equipped with MAN. The ship's force cannot construct a power supply because it has not be possible to draw the necessary parts from any tender or navy yard.
               The MAN unit itself is considered inferior to other FM transmitters and receivers, particularly to the Army SCR 608 and SCR 610, and the Navy MN.
              Some difficulty is experienced when FM sets of different design and manufacture are working together. Ideally, all FM sets used for constant communication should be of the same design and manufacture. Often the SCR 608 or 610 sounds distorted on the MAN receiver and vice versa.
              Another reason for the unsatisfactory communications experienced with the MAN on 34.8 mcs, the fleet common, is the antenna location. On ships of the 692 class, the whip antenna had to be installed on top of the pilot house forward of the director, thus blanking off an area roughly 45 on each quarter. It was impossible to install the antenna on the foremast due to the congestion of radio and radar antennas.
               34.8 mcs was the least reliable circuit used in the operation.
               When MN or other voice radio equipment is installed in destroyers, handsets and loudspeakers, or a selector switch system with one handset and several speakers, should be provided so that all circuits can be operated from either the bridge or CIC. This is not being done, with the exception of the TBS and the regular remote unit for TBL. The BARTON (DD 722) uses a sound powered phone and a loudspeaker on the bridge for the MN, which is not satisfactory.
               With the great increase in the number of circuits to be covered, CIC has become a second main radio on destroyers; for five days seven voice circuits were covered in the BARTON's CIC. To reduce noise level in CIC earphones should be used on most circuits but destroyers are not issued sufficient headsets.
               It is recommended that destroyers be issued ten extra sets of earphones. If destroyers continue to cover the number of circuits now required in an amphibious assault, an increase in radiomen and space is necessary, or a reduced standard of watchkeeping, particularly on voice circuits, must be accepted. In many destroyers all available yeoman are used on voice circuits.
     (b) Call Signs, Publications, Codes & Ciphers. The great profusion of U. S. Army call signs encountered in the Seventh Fleet, which appear to change every hour on the hour, made it difficult to determine addressees on some messages, despite the fact that, all printed and dispatch corrections received had been entered. It is recommended that the Army issue a call book containing its special calls, and "K" and "W" calls, to all ships operating in the Pacific area.
               Both CENTCOM II and CANF SWPA Communication Paln 5-44 were effective for M-1, and although instructions were issued to use calls from CENTCOM II whenever possible, frequently calls for the same unit from both publications were used. Obsolete Seventh  Fleet "L" calls were also used. It would be highly desirable to have one communication plan, one set of calls, one frequency list with one set of circuit designations.
               The old evil of uncorrected publications was again present. Two ships did not hold change No. 1 to CSP 1100(C) and were unable to decipher an important CCM message addressed to them. It was necessary to reencipher the message in ECM. It was originally sent in CCM because one addressee was an Australian cruiser.
               Coding went smoothly with the exception of "Q" messages which are coded in the British numbers code. Twenty long ECM messages can be coded in the time it takes to break one "Q" message. It is recommended that the same system be followed in encoding "Q" messages as is now followed in general messages: encode "Q" messages in ECM addressed to "NERK" and bury the identification in the message text. This would speed up decoding and be received with gratitude by every coding board in the fleet. The "Q" message could also be sent in "numbers" for the benefit of British ships and ships not holding ECM.
               GENERAL. Considering the number of ships involved in M-1 and the overall complexity of the operation, communications were considered good.

C.   Summary of Recommendations.

     1.     Whenever possible, task force and task group commanders use a secondary TBS channel, either voice or MCW, for purely high command traffic.

     2.     Permit the use of TG common LF for plain language administrative traffic when no security is involved and there are no restrictions on the use of radio.

     3.     When a certain type of equipment is authorized for installation in a particular type of ship, exert every effort to place this equipment on all ships. Three of the Destroyer Squadron 60 still have been unable to obtain MN after four months.

     4.     Develop and install on all potential screening ships a VHF voice unit, multiple channel crystal controlled, which can be used during the more stringent conditions of radio silence, or increase the frequency of MN so that it lies between 60-100 mcs and give the set wider distribution, including all DD,DE,APD,YMS.

     5.     Task force commanders consider the establishment of a HF TG common (between 2500 kcs and 4500 kcs) so ships out of VHF range can contact their respective commanders on voice without encroaching on the IFD, LAW, or NGF frequencies. Ships with limited equipment would come up on this frequency only when necessary to send a message; task force and task group commanders maintain continuous guard.

     6.     Develop a VHF MCW transmitter and install on all ships of the DE type and larger.

     7.     Develop and distribute as soon as possible a power supply operating from ship's power for the MAN.

     8.     When VHF voice equipment is installed, provide remote control units both on the bridge and in CIC.

     9.     Issue each destroyer ten extra sets of earphones.

     10.   U.S. Army distribute to naval ships in the PACIFIC a call sign book, similar to the U.S. Navy Call Sign Book (Radio), containing all special Army calls, "K" calls, and "W" calls.

     11.   Encode all "Q" messages in ECM, as well as British numbers, in accordance with the same system now used for general messages. This will speed up decoding, particularly on smaller ships with limited space and personnel.

     12.     In all destroyers, equipped with RCM gear increase the personnel allowance by one radio technician and two graduates of RCM school. At the present time insufficient personnel is available to man the gear in the proper manner and keep it in operating condition.


PART VII
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES


     1.     Casualties. A complete report of casualties in destroyers of the Bombardment and Fire Support Group cannot be submitted since the separation of units prevented reception of all reports.

     2.     Personnel Performance. The performance of duty of all personnel in the destroyers is considered to be excellent. Of particular note is the conspicuous courage and devotion to duty of the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. WALKE, Commander G. F. DAVIS, U.S.N., when his ship was attacked simultaneously by four suicide planes. The ship destroyed two, was hit by the third, and then destroyed the fourth. Commander DAVIS, though fatally wounded, refused to submit to medical treatment or take cover, and continued to direct the fire and damage control efforts of his ship until completion of the attacks and the fires were under control. He died later the same day.


PART VIII


1.   SUICIDE CRASH PLANES.

     The menace of enemy suicide crash planes should not be under-estimated and we should not delude ourselves into believing that it is a temporary expedient of the enemy that will disappear at a later date. The closer we approach to JAPAN, and the more desperate the plight of the JAPS, the greater will be the number of suicide planes encountered.

     Ships of Desron 60 have experienced heavy suicide attacks in the ORMOC, MINDORO and LINGAYEN operations, and the comments which follow are the result of observations made after approximately fifty attacks on these destroyers or nearby ships.

     From the viewpoint of the destroyer or smaller ship, Comdesron 60 does not concur that the suicide plane has less chance of "getting home" than any other type of bombing. The percentage of hits is far greater than any other type of bombing, and, like other types of bombing, the chance of "getting home" on a small ship is dependent to a great extent on the location of the hit. A suicide plane can sink a destroyer or small ship if the suicide plane carries bombs. The majority of small ships hit are generally badly damaged and suffer many personnel casualties.

     The suicide plane can have a tremendous effect on morale, and consequently on the fighting ability of a ship, if the crew is not properly trained and does not possess the necessary fighting spirit. It is a mistake to attempt to minimize too much to the crew the effect of suicide crash planes, particularly if crash dives have been observed. The men and the officers know the results in damage and casualties. Rather the fact should be plainly pointed out to them that the suicide plane is a weapon of considerable effect which will be encountered henceforth, and which must be defeated by skill, determination, and courage. In destroyers and smaller ships, the action of each commanding officer in handling the situation will, in large measure, determine the final effectiveness of the suicide plane attack. The development of the ship's fighting ability and morale to the highest peak is essential.

     The tactics of the JAP suicide planes and the characteristics of their attacks have been observed as follows:

          (a) Approach on target or disposition is made from the direction of any nearby land to nullify radar detection. If heavy CAP is present, approach is generally made low over the water, weaving or jinking to avoid gunfire of ships.

         (b) Few dawn attacks are made. Many attacks are made at dusk low over the water, when CAP has been withdrawn and sighting is difficult.

          (c) Crash approaches during full daylight are made from low over the water or in a fairly steep dive. Steep dives are utilized particularly when cloud-hopping is possible and the dives can be started out of cloud cover or sun. They are generally used when the target is a ship inside the screen and where high altitude can be used to evade the gunfire of the screen while attaining position.

          (d) Detached single ships or small units are particularly inviting targets, and have been subjected to large percentage of attacks.

         (e) Dives and approaches are made at maximum speed to allow as little time as possible for detection, gunfire, and maneuvering of target.

          (f) The point of aim is generally the base of the bridge structure, which gives a point of aim near the turning point of the ship, and makes possible destruction of vital controls and communication facilities of the targets, particularly in destroyers.

         (g) Nearly all approaches or dives are made from abaft the beam of the target ship, probably to avoid early detection by lookouts or radar, or avoid heavy gunfire due to blind sectors in batteries or directors, and to detect quickly any course changes by target.

          (h) Suicide planes avoid dogfights with CAP, and when attacked by CAP, they fly low over the water as possible, heading for the target at full speed. This often brings the planes of the CAP into own AA gunfire and makes interception difficult.

          (i) Suicide planes often approach target area in groups pf three or four planes; then split up for individual attacks to divide gunfire, confuse FD or CAP, and permit some planes to get in undetected.

          (j) If damaged by gunfire or CAP, the plane will endeavor to crash the nearest ship it can reach, regardless of size.

         (k) Some suicide planes carry bombs up to 500 lbs. in size. These may be dropped on one ship while a crash is made on another, or plane may crash a ship releasing bombs just before crashing.

         (l) It was noted that most suicide planes had a tendency to overshoot the target, particularly in the steep dives.

          (m) When an individual ship is attacked simultaneously or in quick succession by a number of suicide planes, it is practically impossible to avoid being hit, except by strong support from close supporting ships.


SUGGESTIONS FOR COUNTERING SUICIDE PLANES


          The following suggestions are made as a result of experience with suicide planes. Some of these suggestions are now being used by Desron 60 with some success. They are particularly applicable to destroyers and screening ships.

          (a) When plane approaches, increase speed to maximum consistent with maintenance of assigned station to protect convoy or heavy ships and afford mutual support.

          (b) Bring director and all possible AA batteries to bear on most dangerous target as soon as possible, but do not neglect targets approaching from other directions that may attempt to sneak in undetected.

          (c) Establish "overhead" lookouts as distinguished from the usual air lookouts.

          (d) Maneuver in as tight turns as possible consistent with keeping batteries on target.

          (e) Develop the maximum rate of fire with all batteries. In this connection, authority must be delegated to gun captains and battery officers to open fire immediately on any approaching hostile plane when within range during daylight. Local control of 5" mounts should be used if the director is slow in getting on target and when the hostile planes are not inside the formation.

          (f) Positive control can be exercised, and the threat justifies, firing over ships of own formation is advocated. It must be done without firing into own ships. Strong mutual support is essential.

          (g) For ships equipped with the latest fire control radars, excessive maneuvering at high speed will often cause a loss of target on the scope, and result in a decrease of effective fire. The answer is, of course, installation of improved type of fire control radars, similar to Mark 12.

          (h) Radical maneuvering is not as effective against suicide planes approaching from low altitude as it is against planes diving or gliding in at an appreciable angle. Maneuvering at high speed is to some extent effective in either case, particularly if the attacking plane is damaged by gunfire to such an extent that its controls are out, its engines sputtering, or the pilot killed. In such cases the inertia and characteristics of the plane will tend to make it continue in the same line of advance, unless a wing or other essential control surface is shot away, tending to deflect the plane from its course.

          (i) In most small ships, the primary ship control stations, fire control stations and equipment, CIC, and communication facilities are located in the bridge structure. A plane striking this area in a destroyer may put out of commission all vital controls in the ship, if the ship is not sunk. This suggests the practicability of throwing the stern of the ship under attack toward the suicide plane in an endeavor to evade or minimize the damage the damage if the plane succeeds in crashing the ship. This maneuver, if carried too far, will decrease effective gunfire from forward batteries, but may develop additional fire power from the after batteries depending on the type of ship. Whether or not to maneuver in this manner, depends on the bearing and altitude of the attacking plane, the apparent damage the plane has suffered, the proximity of the adjacent ships, and the amount of gunfire that can be brought to bear. The commanding officer must exercise good judgement in each case.

          (j) Single ships in isolated picket stations, on detached missions, or in stations beyond mutual gunfire support can be overwhelmed by multiple attacks of suicide planes. They may shoot down two or three planes, but if the attacks continue, the ship will probably be hit. If destroyers are desired on picket stations during daylight, at least two and preferable three should be stationed as a unit. Pickets should not be stationed during daylight unless essential. In task group dispositions, stations must be assigned that will insure close mutual fire support. Only a heavy concentration of accurate fire from all batteries of all ships within range, stationed not further than 1000 to 1500 yards apart, will provide a measure of security. The distance between ships must be such that ships can maneuver independently if necessary to attempt avoiding action or to bring batteries to bear while at the same time affording strong mutual support.

          (k) Due to the short period of time usually involved in a suicide crash attack, with consequent difficulty in getting the 5" battery on the target, one or two mounts should be prepared to fire only Mark 32 fuzed projectiles, in local control if necessary. In firing Mark 32 projectiles, care must be taken to insure that fire is not directed within safety bearings of other ships in the disposition.

          (l) The use of director controlled 24" or 36" searchlights has been advocated for daytime use against suicide planes, although it appears improbably that this practice will have any great effect on confusing the pilot, it is worth trying.

          (m) When air attack threatens, dispositions should increase speed to the maximum practicable, and should be maneuvered to bring the attacking planes aft. When the latter close in to effective gun range, it appears desirable to cease maneuvering the disposition as a whole to avoid losing the target on older type fire control radars due to large turns, and to permit individual ships to maneuver to bring batteries to bear. Dispositions should be closed into a compact circular arrangement of ships formed to afford maximum mutual fire support. For dispositions with slow heavy ships, this means a reduction in the effectiveness of anti-submarine measures, since the destroyers will be too close to the heavy ships. When possible all ships should be on the same circle.

          (n) In the attacks observed thus far the 20 mm. batteries have been of little or no assistance in repelling suicide planes. As pointed out in (h) above, the plane must disintegrate or have a vital control surface shot away to give a reasonable measure of security against crashing, even if the pilot is killed, the plane is afire, or riddled with shells. The replacement of 20 mm. batteries with 40 mm. where space and weight conditions permit, is very desirable. The Japs will continue suicide crashing; the 20 mm, batteries do little to stop it.

          (o) Remain offshore at all times as far as possible and as permitted by the immediate operations in progress.

          (p) Provide a CAP of heavy strength, stacked, with several sections just beyond automatic weapon range and not above 1000 feet. Station sections of CAP low over adjacent land and just inshore from the beach.

          (q) Do not use smoke during daylight while underway.

          (r) All persons at exposed stations must wear flashproof clothing.

          (s) The damage control parties must be divided and must be kept under cover at all times and until their services are required. Damage control equipment must be divided and be accessible in different parts of the ship. A trickle of water should be maintained through fire hoses, but they should be kept in their racks and never laid out until required. The trickle of water may prevent ignition of gasoline sprayed on deck when a plane crashes.

          (t) All bridge personnel not directly connected with fire control should take cover in the pilot house, director base, emergency cabin, etc., upon approach of a suicide plane. Needless waste of lives can thus be avoided.

          (u) The primary method of detecting suicide planes is by lookouts. Every man at a topside station must be a good lookout.


W. L. FRESEMAN.
cc: Cominch (Advance)
     Cincpac (Advance) (3)
     Comdespac
     CDD 120 (Less enclosures)
     BARTON         do
     WALKE           do
     LAFFEY          do
     O'BRIEN         do
     SUMNER        do
     MOALE           do
     INGRAHAM   do
     LOWRY          do