1.          This vessel participated in fleet air strike against shipping in Leyte-Visayan Sea area on 11 and  12 November to the extent of acting as a screening destroyer for carriers and cruisers of Task Group 38.4, one of the three task groups from which the strike was launched. Two groups in company are Task Group 38.1 and 38.3 (OTC). The attack was primarily for the purpose of repelling enemy attempts to land re-inforcements at Ormoc Bay, Leyte, P. I. The three task groups launched the strike at dawn 11 Nov. from the vicinity of 13-30N, 125-30E and maneuvered in this vicinity during the day until final landing of the strike planes that evening.

                       As a result of the strike a convoy was destroyed as described in CTG 38.3 secret dispatch 110830 of November.

           2.         (a) This vessel attached to Task Unit 38.4.3 by order of CTG 38.4 secret dispatch 040557 as modified by his 050532 and departed Ulithi Is. atoll for Lat. 14-35N, Long. 129-10E in company with Task Group 38.4 in accordance with Commander Third Fleet's secret dispatch 030155 of November. At 0700, 7 Nov. rendezvoused with oiler group for topping off all ships. Fueled to capacity from USS ENTERPRISE in accordance with Commander Third Fleet's secret dispatch 071411 of Nov. to proceed to vicinity 17-30N, 138-30E to keep clear of path of typhoon. Operated in this vicinity on 8th and 9th riding out rough seas caused by typhoon to southwest. On 9 November departed this area for vicinity 11N, 127E in preparation for strike in accordance with Commander Third Fleet's 091330 of November. On 10 November changed course to arrive 13-30N, 125-30E as soon after dawn as possible on 11 November in accordance with Commander Third Fleet's 100625. Fueled from USS NEW ORLEANS on 11 November and acted as unit of screen for task group during operations of launching and landing strike ordered by Commander Third Fleet's 101329 of November. Fueled from USS TOMAHAWK on 12 November in vicinity 13-30N, 128-30E prior to next phase of strike on 13 November.

                      (b&c) See CTU 38.4.3 report of this action.

                      (d) No enemy forces were encountered by this vessel, however enemy snooper planes were in the vicinity of the group. These were shot down or forced to retire before reaching the task group.

                      (e) See CTU 38.4.3 report of this action.

Part II.

          1.          A chronological record of this action consists of merely a series of course and speed changes to conform to the task group's maneuvers while screening and while fueling. All radar contacts with the enemy were intercepted by planes from the task force. The only maneuver deemed worthy of explanation is the fueling from USS NEW ORLEANS on 11 November. This was done because of lack of prior opportunity to fuel as a result of heavy seas and expeditions departure for strike rendezvous.

Part III.

          1.          Performances of own and enemy personnel and equipment. No comments.

Part IV.

          1.          This vessel suffered no battle damage and inflicted none on the enemy. Results of the air strike are shown in CTG.3's 110830 of Nov.

Part V.

          1.          The primary TBS frequency was used by all three task groups for tactical purposes and served the purpose well. There were several non-tactical messages delivered over the circuit, however, which tended to interfere with its tactical use. Furthermore it proved unreliable for non-tactical use.

                      Channel Charlie was likewise heavily burdened with traffic between planes and ships. Pilots often cut into other transmission on this circuit when near the formation. Shift to channel baker for landing operations during the strike was not strictly adhered to by the planes.

                      An interference similar to jamming was experienced on the SC-3 radar. This was later attributed to transmissions from nearby ships on voice radio frequency near the SC-3 frequency or one of it's harmonics. This occurred at times in one sector, while at other times in varying sectors of the sweep.

                      A calibration chart has never been made for the SC-3 radar, hence determination of target altitude is very rough using the standard SC-2 calibration chart. It is recommend that this calibration be done as soon as possible.

Part VI.

          1.          Personnel performance was satisfactory. No casualties were suffered.

          1.          On 13 and 14 November, 1944 this vessel again participated as an escort of Task Group 38.4 in air strikes by Task Group's 38.1, 38.3, and 38.4 on central and southern Luzon. Task Group 38.5 joined at 0000, 14 November and participated in the second day's strike. Results of the strikes are shown in Commander Task Group 38.3's 131405 and 160023.

          2.          After fueling on 12 November, Task Group 38.4 proceeded to vicinity 15-30N, 123-30E in company with Task Group's 38.1 and 38.3 to launch strike against central and southern Luzon at dawn 13 November in accordance with Commander Third Fleet's 111125 of November. Strike was launched at dawn 13 November while task groups maneuvered in vicinity of strike launching point. Task groups retired to eastward at sunset and rendezvous with Task Group 38.5 at 0000, 14 Nov. in vicinity 15-30N, 125-30E. Task Force reversed course to return to strike launching point. At dawn 14 November launched second day's strike at central and southern Luzon from vicinity 1530N, 123-30E and operated that vicinity until strike planes landed at sunset 14 Nov. From this area made rapid retirement to 15-30N, 127-30E by 0600 I, 15 November.

          1.          On 16 November fueled to 95% capacity from TOMAHAWK and transferred passenger to BUNKER HILL. Served as unit of screen during remainder of fueling operations in area 13-30N, 131-30E. At 1600 I, 17 November made rendezvous with Task Group 38.2 in 13N, 131-25E. Upon receipt of orders from Commander Third Fleet proceeded on 17 November toward 13-30N, 128-30E. Made rendezvous with oiler group at 1200 I, 18 November and topped off all units. Fueled to 95% capacity. In accordance with orders from Commander Third Fleet proceeded toward vicinity 16N, 124E to launch air strike against enemy shipping, aircraft, and air installations in central Luzon and Mindano areas. At dawn 19 November launched strike and operated in vicinity until landing of strike at sunset, retiring to NE. Enemy snoopers were contacted by the force intermittently throughout the day and up until about midnight. Several snoopers managed to get by the Combat Air Patrol and in as far as the screen just after dark. None of these reached the main body of the group, but were forced to retire or shot down. SUMNER sighted and fired at one Betty approaching at about 100 feet altitude from our starboard quarter. After 40MM guns opened up on the enemy and forced him to retire. The plane was seen to burst into flames at the horizon. Proceeded to 16N, 132E to arrive at 2400 I, 20 November in accordance with Commander Third Fleet's orders.

Part II.

          1.          (a) While on course 055° T at 18 knots two enemy planes approached the ship from 045° T low over the water (about 100 feet). The initial contact was at 13 miles. At about 7 miles the contact split one turning apparently southwest and the other southeast. The northernmost target was tracked by main battery director, remaining at about 7 miles until bearing 130° T. At this point the target started to open to the northwest and the one to southeast turned to make another approach. This second plane was sighted headed just astern of this ship and at about 100 feet elevation. The after 40MM groups opened fire at 1825 and ceased a few seconds later. The plane was observed to veer to eastward and apparently burst into flames and crashed at the horizon bearing 070° T.

Part III.

          1.          At the split it appeared that the left plane would close and the right open, hence, the finally less dangerous target was tracked. The main battery was shifted to the more dangerous target when it was sighted closing but did not get on target in time to fire. The plane took no offensive action; it was apparently retiring and did not see the formation prior to our opening fire. Ten rounds of 40MM ammunition were expended without casualty.

Part IV.

          1.          CIC made use of the VF PPPI for designation of targets to director. The method proved satisfactory, however it is considered that more experience in the use of this equipment is necessary before it can be utilized to its maximum capabilities.

Part V.

          1.          No casualties were suffered.

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